@jens i thought TLS had nothing to do with IP, and the TLS cert just asserts that you are contacting a certain name (as vouched for by other entities who have their own certs)

so DNS (secured by DNSSEC let's say) gives you a claim that 8.8.8.8 is dns.google

and then TLS gives you a claim that you are handshaking with dns.google

is this wrong?

@trwnh ... locator scheme. The resource itself has to contain the information to verify it. Which in crypto terms means a signature and an identifier of the entity signing it (which needs to be a public key or point to one).

At that point, two rather interesting things happen, namely a) the external name given to the resource via a URI/URL is irrelevant to the resource contents, and b) the location of the resource is irrelevant.

Which makes RNS or whatever a very optional thing. By which...

@trwnh ... I mean your RNS could point you to machine A with a URL, and mine could point me to machine B with some tuple of IP and port (single purpose server only producing that resource), and we'd still be reaching the same resource.

The same, cryptographically certifiable, by the magic of copies.

So names are all well and good, but what we really need are identifiers. People love hashes for those, which for a bunch of reasons I like less, but let's go with that.

The point is that this...

@trwnh ... notion of starting with some kind of name, while intuitive to think about, actually has all kinds of problems that we've been trying to solve for a long time by layering solutions on top of each other, and we're still not talking about the thing that'd actually make a difference (signed resources) *and* that'd make all of these layers rather unnecessary.

I hope that makes sense? I feel like my train of thought might not have been too straight a line

@jens thank you!! i think i disagree with usage of “irrelevant” and “unnecessary” but otherwise understand what you are saying about cryptographic identity.

my conception is you use the name to get to a resource whose contents include some key(s) — kind of like a DID resolver returning a DID document which contains keys. but the identifier is still did:example:whatever so you can’t refer to it without going through the whole DID resolution thing

@trwnh The linkage to the IP comes via the sender address in the IP packet. Yes, that could be spoofed, which is yet another issue. I tried to leave that out

But in principle a cert's name could also be an IP address.

It doesn't really matter for my rant, because that's more about there not being any connection to the resource or its "owner" for lack of a better term.

@trwnh So how do you know you and I get the same keys for did:example:whatever?

It's the same problem again?

@jens the part i am specifically interested in having stable identifiers and stable references. so avoiding link rot.

one way is to have the resource assert its own identifiers, but this is only a unidirectional claim. you’d need to dereference every single claimed alias to be sure. not good!

another way is to make the identifier based in something intrinsic to the resource or thing. for a blob of content, hashing contents works. for mutable descriptors? i’m not sure…

@jens how indeed!

@jens the word the w3c people are using is “controller”

@trwnh No, I'm basically picking random identifiers here, for some definition of random

There's a whole lot of stuff hanging off of that, but the TL;DR is that a random identifier and a signature by the owner is good enough.

It can't prevent a collision, but it can ensure that my foo and your foo are different. Arguably the full identifier then are the tuples (foo, me, sig) and (foo, you, sig). But for most purposes except validation, foo is fine.

@jens so zot_guid and zot_sig, to borrow from prior art…

now here’s the hard part: how do you rotate keys without having to resign every single existing resource?

@trwnh No, no, Zot relies on names again. Really, let's not.

Rotating keys, ah... that leads down a new rabbit hole for which it really is too late.

It's doable, suffice to say!

@jens if you’d like to pick up at some future point i would be interested in hearing more — the tradeoff with key-based identity as i understand it is that key rotation invalidates old signatures. which is afaik why zot uses a random guid and then signs that guid (iirc). sounds a lot like that tuple you were talking about, but it’s been a while since i read the zot protocol docs.

if you have any other resources you can point to in the meantime (heh), i’d appreciate those

@jens really my concern here is that losing a key means losing all your resources and breaking all existing links. i don’t think most people want cryptographic guarantees when alternative means of establishing identity will do fine. for all its problems, people generally trust DNS. can we extend that trust to resources? arbitrary name-to-thing lookup where you can register not just IP addresses but also arbitrary resources? like doi: or isbn: but for anything, by any host

@jens hopefully you at least see why i’m not fully giving up on the RNS idea lol

@jens but anyway you dont have to answer that right away. have a pleasant night!

or actually… maybe //host/thing is good enough if you trust the host to not lie about its own resources?

i wonder if it makes more sense to build RNS as an extension of DNS or if it should be a reimplementation of the same principles but

ah shit i’m reinventing XRI aren’t i

as i’ve read it, the w3c tag opposed xri on the grounds that it was unnecessary when http: could do most of what anyone cared to do at the time

i would personally counter that the w3c tag was being extremely short-sighted for what seems to me like mostly political reasons

it’s on one hand“http supremacist” and on the other hand failing to acknowledge the shortcomings of http: as a uri scheme. the very existence of https: as a separate scheme proves this, while failing to address shortcomings.